and love of labour, too incompatible with an European education to be depended on. Ye fovereigns, who ought to be the fathers of your people, and the friends of humanity, fince your thrones are in the hearts of your fubjects, make your glory only to confift in rendering them happy; renounce that military pomp which breathes nothing but deftruction; confider that large ftanding armies preferve a reciprocal diftruft between you, prevent the people from applying to more ufeful labours, and tend only to exhaust your treasures, which are the fruits of their industry. Think that if those large armies caufe fometimes great devastation in the enemies country, it is never until after they have ruined their own. Let the ineftimable advantages of the European tactics, on the banks of the Danube, in 1788, be estimated. Was not the Emperor's army obliged to confine itfelf to a defenfive war? Have not the Ottomans, without generals, and without military knowledge, attacked fometimes with fuccefs; and have they not always with as much in telligence as intrepidity, refifted the efforts of their enemies, without expofing themselves to the hazard of a decifive battle.

In the present state of things, the Mahometans, devoted to the defence of their religion, are born foldiers; and it would be neceffary to make them fo, were they fubjected to the restraint of rules, and to measured evolutions, liable to amendments and variations. There would be more inconveniencies than advantages in changing the education of a nation entirely occupied with itfelf, and tenacious of its customs, fince it would be neceffary to deftroy preju dices, and to make it adopt new ideas; but thefe changes in the opinions of a people have too much influence on their moral, military, and political fyftems, to hazard the expe

After the example of the Roman foldiers, the young Turks incorporated among the janiffaries, exercife with one another in running, wrestling, and leaping, and challenge each. other who fhall carry the largest stone on the back of his hand, and who in running fhall throw it to the greateft diftance. They exercife themfelves alfo in throwing the djerit at one another, and in warding off the blow. This is the exercife likewife. of the young noblemen deftined for the profeffion of arms. They dart it on horfeback with much address, and when it rebounds, they take it up again, riding on a full gallop. Thefe exercifes, which the Ottomans make their amufement, render them dexterous, agile, vigorous, and hardy, and at the fame time make them good horsemen.

The Turkish government fupplies its foldiers with arms and aminunition, but as the Ottomans in general are fond of military fervice, and embrace it from choice, it is common, for each foldier to carry his fabre, his fufee, and one or two piftols at his girdle along with him; and to prevent any inconvenience which might arife from an inequality in the calibres, fmall bars of lead are diftributed to each foldier, which they cut to whatever fize they please. The Turks being accuftomed to the

ufe

of Negropont, which belonged to the Venetians.

The Sultan Selim I. whofe reign was as fhort as it was glorious, made fome preparation for the conftruction of arfenals, in different parts of his empire. Under his reign the Ottomans had already several veffels, and Soliman I. his fucceffor, made ufe even of his fleet to feize upon the ifland of Rhodes; under the reign of that Prince the Italians ravaged the Morea, which was retaken by the Ottomans. Soliman afterwards fent a fleet to the Mediterranean, to cooperate with the French, and after this he undertook the siege of Malta; his commanders alfo committed hoftilities against the Portuguese, on the coast of Ormus, with fhips which they had equipped in the Perfian Gulph. Under the reign of Selim II. the Ottomans, emboldened by the taking of Cyprus, and by the fuccefs of their arms, fet on foot formidable arma ments destined for the Mediterranean, but they loft the famous battle of Lepanto, where John of Austria commanded the armaments of Spain and Italy united, and where the maritime forces of the empire were annihilated.

This lofs, however, did not difcourage the Ottomans. After have ing re-established their marine, they were able, under Mahomet IV. to feize on the island of Crete, as well as the fortrefs of Candia; but under the fame reign the Ottoman marine went to decline, and their flect, feveral times beat or routed by the Venetians, could not prevent, towards the end of the feventeenth century, the lofs of all the Morea. This valt province was, however, retaken in the beginning of this century, under the reign of Achmet III. as much for want of forefight in the Venetians, as by the activity of the Ottoman Generals. Gianum Cogea, grand admiral, and a warlike man, not depending fo

much on the Ottoman marine, as to hazard an engagement, ordered the troops to make feveral descents, and the Ottomans were in a condition to attack places before the Venetians thought of defending them. However powerful the afcendancy of the allies then might have been, the Morea, foon retaken by the Ottomans, has fince remained in their hands, notwithstanding the lofs they fuftained at the fame time by the battle and fortrefs of Belgrade.

In the fifteenth and fixteenth cen. turies, when the powers of Eurojė had only a rifing marine, all nations were then almolt on a level. The Ottomans, the Spaniards, the Maltefe, the Tufcans, and the other flags of Italy, then fcoured the Mediterranean, as much to procure booty as to combat. As the fouthern nations, even then, preferved fome remains of that spirit of chivalry which prevailed in the preceding centuries, the Ottoman veffels were feen in the Mediterranean, bidding defiance, in fome measure, to the Maltese, the Spaniards, and the Italians, in fingle engagements, where a fkill in marcevres was of little avail, and desperate courage did every thing. The Turks then were accounted brave; they were indeed the only people who had preferved from the ancients the custom of boarding, and it appears that in general they acquitted themselves welf in this refpect; but in proportion as Europe gave itfelf up to the emulation of conqueft, and to that fpirit of enterprife by which it has always been agitated; and in proportion as it brought its knowledge to perfection, and fubjected every thing to principles and to demonftration, by calculations, its marine made an a ftonifing progrefs, and, except in a few inftances, the Ottomans have remained at the fame place from which we fet out. The theory of naviga tion, and the form of veffels, were afterwards

afterwards brought to perfection; boarding became lefs convenient, and more difficult, becaufe the fame experience which directed the dangers of it, taught alfo that they ought to be avoided. All naval fcience at prefent confifts in manoeuvring with kill, in the knowledge of evolutions, in readily feizing advantages, in profiting by the faults of the enemy, and in the art of refifting ftorms, and fubjecting the elements to the intrepidity and conftancy of men. This application fuppofes an obftinate la bour, which the Ottomans are not capable of undergoing, but it is perhaps incompatible with their prejudices, and with that blind fubmiffion to fate, which feems to profcribe men from combining means to protect themfelves from danger. The Ottomans confefs their inferiority at fea, and, without blushing at their ignorance, fay, that God gave them the earth to be the theatre of their victories, and that he left the fea to the Chriftians.

The Ottomans have established their navy a little; that which they have, ought to be confidered rather as a demonftration of their power than as of any real utility. There fails every year from the capital a fquadron of feveral fhips and galleys, which goes to the Archipelago, to receive tribute, and fends a divifion as far as Alexandria. The departure of this fleet at the end of April, and its return at the end of October, according to the etiquette of the Eaftern empire, fome ufages of which the Ottomans have preferved, are two days of triumph and folemnity. One would fay when the fleet departs, that the Ottoman admiral was going to dispute the empite of the fea with all other nations, and, on his return, that not one enemy remained to be conquered.

The two wars with Ruffia, in 1769 and 1787, were fatal to the Ottoman navy. In the firft, their fleet was burnt at Chefme; and, in the fecend,

the armaments which they fent into the Black Sea were expofed to ftorms; and to fome loffes. The Turkish fquadron, however, forced that of Ruffia to return to harbour, whilft it kept poffeffion of the feas during all the campaign of 1788.

The Ottoman navy is not formida: ble by itfelf, and it is ftill lefs fo, on account of the inexperience of its commanders: of all nations, however, they are the people who might have the readieft means of establishing a powerful navy, were they fully fenfible of the neceflity of it. Independent of the number and fafety of their harbours, their territories abound with every production requifite for conftructing and rigging veffels, whilst the fhores of Albania, of the Morea, the Archipelago, the Propontis, thofe of the Black Sea, and of Afia and Egypt, which make more than a thoufand leagues in extent of fea coast, might fupply them with plenty of sailors, active and strong, and very proper for navigation. The greater part of thefe mariners being Greeks, there would be fome inconvenience in trufting them with fhips and arms; and, on the other hand, the Turks not being much inclined to a fea life, they would not derive any benefit from thofe advantages which nature has lavifhed upon them.

The maritime force of the Ottoman empire confifts in fhips of the Ine, frigates, gallies, and other small vefels with oars, which they employ in the Archipelago, and the Black Sea. They have, generally, never above from fifteen to twenty veffels, or frigates, and it is only fince the war in 1769 that they have increafed their number, and made fome improvements in the conftruction of them. Their hips, though heavily built, are light failers, but they eally grow crooked. This arifes, no doubt, from the quality of the timber, which is neither fo hard, nor fo compact as that of the north, and their fhips

de

do not last long. It is true, that among the Ottomans, where Provi dence does every thing, and where the men are employed only in deftroying, lefs care is bestowed than in Europe on the building and prefer ving of fhips.

of the coafts.

*

The Ottoman Porte has no more than twelve or fifteen gallies in its fervice, three of which belong to the ftate; the other nine, as well as a few galliots and xebeques, belong to the Beys of Smyrna, Scio, Mitylene, Rhodes, Negropont, the Morea, &c. and are intended for the prefervation The Grand Signior allows thefe governors revenues, in fiefs or military benefices, on condition of their furnishing, at their own expence, a galley armed and victual. ed. The three galleys which belong to government are manned with criminals; but the crews of thofe of the Beys are compofed only of volunteers, who receive pay, or Circaffian, Mingrelian, or Georgian flaves, whom the Beys employ in cultivating their lands when they have finished a campaign. These flaves being a real property, the Beys are interested in sparing them, and they are well nous rifhed.

The Regencies of Barbary, tributary to the Grand Signior, fuch as Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoly, are obliged, in time of war, to furnifh veffels for the defence of the ftate; but

they are fupplied by government with provifions, ammunition, and every thing neceflary for equipping them.

As the Ottomans have no colonies to prelerve, and no foreign commerce to protect; and as they neither feek for diftant conqueits, nor for any po litical influence over thofe projects with which Europe is continually agitated, they have no occafion for great naval forces. This empire, on one fide, is at peace with all the maritime and commercial powers; and, on the other, by political intrigue, which may concern the tranquillity of nations; religious armaments never ap proaching the coafts of Turkey, the Porte is not in a fituation to exert it felf by fea to make them be refpected. Such an expence would not only be a mere lofs for the empire, but it might become burdenfome to it, because the commanders of its veffels would fuffer themfelves to be feduced by opportunities, and a greedinefs for plunder; and its repofe, and its arms, would foon or late be found at variance. This political confideration, of which all commercial nations know the value, ought, in my opinion, to engage them to agree to a neutrality in the Turkish ports, or to make the ports of the Mediterranean be refufed to fuch nations as might come to disturb its tranquillity, and to interrupt the com merce of Europe with the Ottoman empire.