"child; and who, after having thus warmed him, reftored him alive to "his mother." The fame difcourfe of the director prefents another feature as edifying as remarkable. Maffillon had juft been made a Bishop, but no place at Court, no bufinefs, nor pretence of any kind could detain him at a diftance from his flock. The Abbé Fleury, a rigid obferver of the canons, confidered nothing in the reception of this new member, but the rigorous duties which his Bishopric impofed on him: the duties of the Academician never prefented themselves to his mind; far from exorting the new member to conftant attendance, he recommended to him a perpetual abfence; and what tended to make the advice parricularly fevere was the obliging form of regret in which it was expreffed. "We forefee with grief, faid he, that we are about to lofe you for ever, and that the indifpenfable law of refidence will remove you from our affemblies without the hope of your return: we cannot expect to fee you, except at those times when fome difagreeable bufinefs fhall tear you in fpite of your felf, from the church you are bound to attend." He This advice was fo much the more efficacious, as he who received it had previously refolved to adopt it. He departed for Clermont, whence he never returned, but on account of indifpenfible occafions, and confequently very rarely. He gave all his attention to the happy people whom providence had confided to his care. did not imagine that the dignity which he had merited by his fuccefs in the pulpit, was to excufe him from appearing there any more; or that because he had been rewarded, he might then ceafe to be useful. He benevolently dedicated to the inftruction of the poor, thofe fame talents fo much efteemed by the great of this world, and preferred to the loud applaufe of the courtier, the fimple and earnest attention of an auditory, lefs brilliant, but more teachable. Perhaps the most eloquent of his fermons are the conferences he held with his curates. He preached to them the virtues of which he fet them an example, difintereftednefs, fimplicity, forgetfulness of himself, the active and prudent earnefinefs of an enlightened conviction, very different from that fanaticifm which proves nothing but the blindnefs of zeal, and which makes the fincerity of it very doubtful. A wife moderation was indeed his predominant character. He took delight in affembling at his country houfe, Jefuits and members of the Oratory; he accustomed them to bear with, and almost to love one another; he made them play at chefs together, and exhorted them never to engage in more ferious conteíts. The conciliating difpofition of his mind, of which his conduct gave fufficient evidence, and his well known manner of thinking with regard to the fcandal of theological quarrels, made the government defirous, that he fhould attempt to reconcile the Cardinal de Noailles with those who impugned the doctrine of that pious Archbishop; but the impartiality which he fhewed in that negociation produced its natural effect, that of the discontent of both fides. In vain he reprefented to them that men, whofe duty it is to preach the gofpel to their brethren, ought not to begin by violating one of its principal precepts, that of unity and peace: that their difputes, already fo vexatious about Love to God, did not exempt them from the duty of loving their neighbours; and that these difputes were both an occafion of scandal to the weak, and a subject of triumph to the unbeliever, however unjuftly. Thefe wife remonftrances were ineffectual, and he found by experience, that it is often lefs difficult to reclaim the backflider, than to conciliate thofe who think it their interest to combine in order to confound him. (To be continued) State State of the Military Forces of the Turks. By Mr Chenier. THE first foldiers of Othman, the founder of the Turkish empire; were only volunteers, whom a fpirit of turbulence and a tafte for arms had collected together; incited by the glory of conquering, by avarice and fuperftition, they were contented with plunder, and with the hopes of para dife. When Orean, his fon, had extended his conquefts far enough to form grander projects, he was fenfible that it would be neceflary to have an army obedient to their chief, and to complete that military difcipline which his father had already introduced. He, therefore, established for the infantry à daily pay, which increased in proportion to the length of time they ferved; and gave lands to the old foldiers, who, in return, were obliged to furnish a certain number of armed horsemen. Such was the origin of regular troops in the Ottoman empire, and this plan has been followed and improved, according as the Sultans found their power increafe. The most celebrated troops of the Turkish empire are the Janiffaries who pique themfelves much on their bravery and fidelity: they never fuffer any foreign caftes to be incorporated with them; and even Arabs, Egyptians, and Moors, although MaKometans, cannot be admitted among this body. The number of the Janiffaries who receive pay is not exactly known. At the beginning of this century there were an hundred and eighty-fix companies; but as fome of them are very numerous, and others much less for I doubt much whether this militia exceeds fixty thoufand men, who are difperfed throughout the capital, and all the ftrong places of the empire. The Janiffaries are allowed to exercife mechanical profeflions. Thofe who are not married, who labour, and who, for this reafon, are not lodged VOL. XI. No. 65. Pp in barracks, do not receive victuals. Next to the Janiffaries are the cannoniers, bombardiers, miners, and others, who each have their chief, and perform their fervice feparately. From the Grand Signior to the humbleft individual; all the Turks are honoured with being Janiffaries. There are noge who do not confider it as an honour to ferve, or to contribute towards the defence of their religion, but the Janiffaries only perform fervice, and receive pay; the reft are honorary foldiers. Each company has its particular money-box; under the direction of à commiffary, and a few officers. The wealth of the deceafed Janiffaries is depofited in it, and whatever is taken from this treafury, must be employed only for keeping up tents, and other military articles; for relieving infirm or neceffitous foldiers, or for the ranfom of Jariffaries who are flaves. The troops of the feraglio, and the fovereign's guards, the Boftangis, the Capigis, and the Baltagis, form a part of the Ottoman militia; but thefe go to war only occafionally attached to the fervice of the palace, and the per fon of the prince, they never march but along with him. In the provinces there are troops of infantry, who replace. the Janiffa ries when occafion may require; but thefe never receive pay except when they are employed, and it is furnished by the province to which they be-, long. Independent of thefe bodies of foldiers, who ate augmented according to emergencies, in cafe of war, the provinces are obliged, at their own expences, to raife recruits, who are paid a certain fum for the campaign. Befides this, the Ottoman army inforced, and often over burdened with a multitude of volunteers, attracted by a defire for pillage, and a love to their religion; but thefe rein is re forcements forcements, instead of being of any affittance, ferve only to wafte provifions, and to fpread confufion, because fuch crowds of undifciplined foldiers, acknowledging no chief, can never act in concert together. The principal ftrength of the Ottoman army confifts in cavalry, on ac count of the abundance and goodness of their horfes, their skill in mana ging them, and the dexterity with which they ufe fwords and fcimetars. The Turkish cavalry, however, is not fo numerous as their infantry, but it. is nearly fo. A part of this cavalry, not exceeding fifteen or fixteen thoufund men, is deftined for the fultan's guard, and is paid by the state; the reft, which comes from the provinces, is paid alfo by the ftate, when in actual fervice; but, at all other times, it is maintained by officers called Zaim and Timariot, who enjoy thefe military benefices, in order to furnish, in cafe of neceffity, a number of armed cavaliers, proportioned to the fiefs which they poffefs, and the produce of their lands, which is a pay anticipated. Thefe eftablishments have Been tranfmitted from the Romans, who diftributed to the military upon the frontiers of their empire a part of their conqueffs. The Franks, when they entered Gaul, thewed the fame berality to their foldiers; but thefe hiefs paffed infenfibly to individuals, called Knights Bannerets, and even to Ecclefiaftics; and the enjoyment of thefe benefices fubje&ted them to military fervice. Thefe inftitutions, which have varied in Europe, have been perpetuated in Turkey, where, notwithstanding the abufes of which they are fceptible, they are obferved with the utmolt fidelity. This feudal militia is generally united under the banner of its Sangiak, or commander. This formerly was one of the most diftinguished employments, when there were neither Beys nor Pachas; but, fince the regulations made by Soliman, what is called the Sangiak is only an office of the foweft rank; it has only to diftinguish it the fangiak, or flag, from which it derives its name. Above this officer there is the Sangiak-Bey and the Pacha, among whom the Beigler-Beys are the most honourable, and they have a number of Sangiaks under their jurifdiction. The conformity of these titles, fince the Roman empire to this period, leave us in no doubt refpecting their origin. The Romans called them Vexillarii Milites, the French Bannerets; and the Ottomans name them Sangiak, all of which indicate the flag, or banner, under which the foldiers were affembled. According to an estimate made by Count Marfigli, this cavalry amounts to more than fifty thoufand men, independent of an equal namber, or nearly fo, kept on the frontier places, or attending the Pachas, and other lords who are in the mili tary service. Thefe different bodies of the Turkish cavalry make more than an hundred and twenty thousand men ; and as the Tartars, united to the Ottomans by the fame intereft and the fame belief, may easily affemble as many, in cafes of abfolute neceffity, the Grand Signior can raife more than two hundred thoufand armed horfemen. Confining ourselves to the fame number of infantry, it ap pears that the Ottoman empire can fet on foot from four to five hundred thoufand foldiers, without reckoning volunteers, whilft it fcarcely pays fixty thousand embodied in the time of peace. Such is the advantage which the Ottoman empire has over its neighbours in military force, fince the latter, obliged at all times to fupport powerful armies, are under the neceffity of making the greatest efforts, though they may have neither the fame means in refpect of riches, nor the fame resources in respect of population, The methodical motions of European tactics, are always afraid of the effects produced by their harmony. The Europeans have the inestimable advantage of encampments, of their artillery being readily and exactly ferved, of the activity of their mufquetry, of the use of the bayonet, and of the knowledge of evolutions; while the Ottomans have nothing to oppose to this military theory, but blind courage and ferociousness, which, subjected to chance, are almost always unfuccefsful. They never make use of the bayonet; they are flow in handling their mufkets, which, through impatience, they abandon for their naked fabres, and both officers and foldiers, who fcarcely differ in any The Ottomans have preferved the manner of fighting practifed by the ancients; and, as they are not very fond of innovations, it is doubtful whether they will ever adopt any other. Their army, when the ground upon which it is drawn up will admit, forms a crefcent, which they extend to a fufficient length to enclofe the enemy, and this cannot fail of giving them the advantage in point of number; but as, in the environs of the Danube, which are the ufual theatre of their wars, the Ottomans cannot eafily adopt this method, on account of the inequality of the ground, it often happens that their detachments, which make attacks without order, and without concert, impede one another, and render their efforts of nothing but their rank, follow the fame avail, if they do not deftroy each o- plan, fo that, in fuch impetuous mother. It is the intereft of the Ot- tions, the fate of the battle is foon tomans to avoid general actions, and decided. to confine themselves to fkirmithing, and to the defending of pofts, in which they can signalize their bravery, and attack with advantage, with out being under any constraint in their evolutions. In fuch actions they have been often feen to return feveral times upon the enemy, with their fabres in their hands, and at length to obtain a complete victory; whilft, in general actions, their natural impetuofity, a want of forefight, and the irregularity with which they make their attacks, ferve only to fpread confufion'; and a large army, once fhaken and routed, cannot be again easily rallied. Notwithstanding thofe fits of confidence or fear, which fuperftition infpires into the Ottomans, they cannot be accused with a want of courage theirs, excited by fanaticifm, rifes often to ferocity. An Ottoman foldier is never afraid of another; but, in a pitched battle, if an European army can once withstand the impetuous fire of the Ottomans, they may confider themselves as fure of obtaining a victory; because the latter, not being capable of following the regular and The Ottoman foldiers, as well as thofe of the Romans, are honoured by their office, and the first step of an officer is to be a common janiffary; because, in Turkey, it is only by obeying that one can learn to command. The Ottoman troops are fubmiffive to the orders of their chiefs; but, notwithstanding their respect for this effential part of difcipline, their ardent difpofition, and the influence which war always has over events, render them haughty and ready to mutiny, and to entertain a spirit of revolt; but it is to the want of prudence in their chiefs, or to the circumftances of the moment, that we must attribute thofe infurrections, which have often decided the fuccefs of campaigns, determined the fate of generals, and disturbed the repose of the empire. The Ottoman foldiers are in general fine troops; we may even fay that they are good troops, as they ferve with good will, and not through constraint; for it is not upon difcip. line only that the real strength of an army depends. The Ottoman folPP 2 diers diers never enervate.themselves by repofe; and if they are ever fo little trained, and well commanded, they are fit to undertake any thing. Among the Ottomans uniformity of ftature is not much regarded, and every man is a foldier, provided he is in a condition to ferve. Befides, the Ottomans are, in general, very fire men. There is no uniform colour either for their drefs. The janiffaries, howe ver, wear a green drefs, and large blue breeches, without adhering too rigorously to the fame fhade of colour. The troops are paid every three months, and they themselves are obliged to furnish their own clothes. The Ottomans exercife their foldiers with great guns, bombs, and the mufket, and they are fubjected to no other military exercife whatever, Formerly they were exercifed in fhooting with the bow and crofs, bow, but these are no longer ufed fince the mufket has fupplied their place. It is not poffible to reconcile the precision of the European tactics, with the prejudices of a nation, as averfe to the customs of others as it is tenacious of its own. The Ottoman forces would be invincible, did they, to the delirium of fanaticifm and fuperiority of numbers, unite a practice in the art of war, and the fcience of evolutions. Conducted by the law of deftiny, and being little fufceptible of deliberate courage, the Ottomans fellow only a rapid impulfion, which infpires ferocity or fear. However dangerous it may be to deftroy the prejudices of a nation, there are fill other obftacles, perhaps equally infurmountable. Having very little defile for making conquefts, the Ottomans keep on foot no more forces than are neceffary for preferving what they have already acquired, and in time of peace they fcarcely pay the fixth part of what they can arm in time of war. Should they form their militia according to the military evolutions brought to perfection in Europe, it would be neceffary alfo that they fhould have numerous legions conftantly exercised, and always ready to combat, which would encrease, in the proportion of fix to one, the expences destined for the maintainance of foldiers, and give to the army, already poffeffed of too much influence, an afcendency that might entirely destroy public tranquillity. It is to be prefumed befides, and we are to expect the fame thing from time and from reafon, that the fury of arms, and that ferfection of evolutions will, perhaps, relax in Europe; and that fovereigns will rencunce thofe formidable armies, which impoverish their people by the expences they occafion, and by depriving agriculture of a number of hands, fo much the more neceffary, as the earth requires more care, fince the wants of men have been multi plied. They will then reduce to fimlicity thofe evolutions, the whole merit of which confifts in precifior, and which are, perhaps, incompatible with the hazard and confufion of engagements. Might they not be con tented with keeping on foot only an army fufficient to protect their fron tiers, and a body of provincial mili, tia exercifed from time to time, and always ready to affenble for the defence of the ftate? This militia might eafily perform fimple evolu tions; and thofe ftriking manoeuvres, which have contributed to the ag; grandifement and the glory of the Houfe of Brandenburg, and which the late King of Pruffia alone had a paffion for bringing to perfection, be, coming infenfibly effaced from the remembrance of nations, they will all find themfelves upon a level in this refpect. It must every where be allowed that foldiers cannot be familiarifed with thefe manœuvres, but by tormenting them, and keeping them in continual activity, which requires |