the justice of the common law. From the case of a chattel bailed to acquire additional value by the labor or skill of an artisan, the doctrine of specific lien has been extended to almost every case in which the thing has been improved by the agency of the bailee. Yet in the recent case of Jackson v. Cummins, 5 Mees. & Welsb. 342, it was held to extend no further than to cases in which the bailee has directly conferred additional value by labor or skill, or indirectly by the instrumentality of an agent under his control; in supposed accordance with which it was ruled that the agistment of cattle gives no lien. But it is difficult to find an argument for the position that a man who fits an ox for the shambles, by fatting it with his provender, does not increase its intrinsic value by means exclusively within his control. There are certainly cases of a different stamp, particularly Bevan v. Waters, Mood. & Malk. 235, in which a trainer was allowed to retain for fitting a race-horse for the turf. In Jackson v. Cummins we see the expiring embers of the primitive notion that the basis of the lien is intrinsic improvement of the thing by mechanical means; but if we get away from it at all, what matters it how the additional value has been imparted, or whether it has been attended with an alteration in the condition of the thing? It may be said that the condition of a fat ox is not a permanent one; but neither is the increased value of a mare in foal permanent; yet in Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 Mees. & Welsb. 270, the owner of a stallion was allowed to have a lien for the price of the leap. The truth is, the modern decisions evince a struggle of the judicial mind to escape from the narrow confines of the earlier precedents, but without having as yet established principles adapted to the current transactions and convenience of the world. Before Chase v. Westmore, 5 Maule & Selw. 180, there was no lien even for work done under a special agreement; now, it is indifferent whether the price has been fixed or not. In that case Lord Ellenborough, alluding to the old decisions, said that if they" are not supported by law and reason, the convenience of mankind certainly requires that our decisions should not be governed by them;" and Chief Justice Best declared in Jacobs v. Latour, 5 Bing. 132, that the doctrine of lien is so just between debtor and creditor, that it cannot be too much favored. In Kirkham v. Shawcross, 6 T. R. 17, Lord Kenyon said it had been the wish of the courts, in all cases and at all times, to carry the lien of the common law as far as possible; and that Lord Mansfield also thought that justice required it, though he submitted when rigid rules of law were against it. What rule forbids the lien of a warehouseman? Lord Ellenborough thought, in Chase v. Westmore, that every case of the sort was that of a sale of services performed in relation to a chattel, and to be paid for, as in the case of any other sale, when the article should be delivered. Now, a sale of warehouse room presents a case which is bound by no pre-established rule or analogy; and, on the ground of principle, it is not easy to discover why the warehouseman should not have the same lien for the price of future delivery and intermediate care that a carrier has. The na dol Low & Wood, (,00 Cal 408) - 1573 Agistors Sien, How Created - In order that the agiston him given by sect 3057 attade it is Essent ite Civil Code a parin anal be mage placed with its owner, or some agister by its hain authority from Conditional sale of horse - Deposit in me in Livery - with in Seller- no bien lable byowner. is created in favor y a living slotle keep for in feeding of a home left with lim having possession thing In a by me a conditional sales, by the terms of which the title is relained in the seller moth the purpment of the purchase price, ve to pay which ith home is to be failur retormed to the seller without cost or Expense Miller & Maraton (or d694; An agrètero lien attactics only to thes aminal fed not to other attachments ao sled robes etc. the justice of the common law. From the case of a chattel bailed to acquire additional value by the labor or skill of an artisan, the doctrine of specific lien has been extended to almost every case in which the thing has been improved by the agency of the bailee. - Yet in the recent case Tackson v xtend d adity of t was alt to ›r the ts in e cer Lood. ing a xpiratrin e get been a the at ox mare 270, of the ne ju rece > the se v. done price o the ison, ould icobs ween ham h of mon jusainst ough at of for, ered. y no it is jame rrier has. The one delivers at a different time, the other at a different place; the one after custody in a warehouse, the other in a vehicle; and that is all the difference. True, the measure of the carrier's responsibility is greater; but that, though a consideration to influence the quantum of his compensation, is not a consideration to increase the number of his securities for it. His lien does not stand on that. He is bound in England by the custom of the realm to carry for all employers at estab lished prices; but it is by no means certain that our ancestors brought the principle with them from the parent country as one suited to their condition in a wilderness. We have no trace of an action for refusing to carry; and it is notorious that the wagoners, who were formerly the carriers between Philadelphia and Pittsburg, frequently refused to load at the current price. Now, neither the carrier nor the warehouseman adds a particle to the intrinsic value of the thing. The one delivers at the place, and the other at the time, that suits the interest or the convenience of the owner of it, in whose estimation it receives an increase of its relative value from the services rendered in respect of it, else he would not have undertaken to pay for them. I take it, then, that, in regard to lien, a warehouseman stands on a footing with a carrier, whom in this country he closely resembles./ Now, it is clear from Sodergren v. Flight & Jennings, cited 6 East, 662, that where the ownership is entire in the consignee, or a purchaser from him, each parcel of the goods is bound, not only for its particular proportion, but for the whole, provided the whole has been carried under one contract; it is otherwise where to charge a part for the whole would subject a purchaser to answer for the goods of another, delivered by the bailee with knowledge of the circumstances. In this instance, the entire interest was in Hamilton & Humes, in whose right the plaintiff sues; and the principle laid down by the presiding judge was substantially right. On the other hand, the full benefit of it was not given to the defendant in charging that the demand and refusal was evidence of conversion. There was no evidence of tender to make the detention wrongful; and the defendant would have had cause to complain, had the verdict been against him, of the direction to deduct the entire price of the storage from the value of the articles returned, and to find for the plaintiff a sum equal to the difference. But there has been no error which the plaintiff can assign. B. Lien given by wrongdoer, when good against true owner. In an action upon the case for a trover and conversion brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, being an innkeeper, for a horse. The case, upon the defendant's plea in bar, was this: The defendant keeping a common inn, a stranger brings the plaintiff's horse into this Common inn of the defendants, there sets him for some time, and afterwards goes his way, leaving the plaintiff's horse there as a pledge for his meat. Review. Abstract Only diff. bit this & Sonies that there There is option, here Con. with ian peeper. custom & Eng.. Cannot use -house, so he eats, his head of. what do? ise forse come The defendant, being the innkeeper, being not paid for the meat of the horse, retains the horse for his meat; the plaintiff afterwards, being the true owner of the horse, and hearing that his horse was there, demanded his horse of the defendant, who refused to deliver him. Upon this he brings his action. The defendant by way of plea in bar, sets forth all this matter of his keeping a common inn, how that the horse was brought thither, and there left at meat, which was unpaid, and that he retained the horse for his meat, till he was satisfied for the same, and that if the plaintiff would pay him for his meat, he would then deliver the horse to him, but not otherwise; upon this plea the plaintiff demurred in law. Upon the first opening of this case, the court inclined to be of opin he might well retain the horse, and that against the plaintiff, being the Mover on against the plaintiff'; that the defendant's plea was good, and that withstanding his horse was left there by a stranger, unknown to the DODDERIDGE, Justice. This is a common inn, and the defendant a common innkeeper, and this his retainer here is grounded upon the general custom of the land: he is to receive all guests and horses that come to his inn; he is not bound to examine who is the true owner of the horse brought to his inn; he is bound, as he is an innkeeper, to receive them, and therefore there is very great reason for him to retain him, until he be satisfied for his meat which he hath eaten; and that the true owner of the horse cannot have him away, until he have satisfied the innkeeper for his meat. The court agreed with him herein, but the court said, that this being a new and a good case, they held it fit to be argued by counsel on both on a hove the real owner. An innkeeper has a right to a lion for feed, |