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a united, and patriotic, and successful resistance may soon be made to the government of a proud despot and his minions, who in their stupid obstinacy now tyrannise over the sleeping energies of a great and once valiant nation; and that the Spanish people may show that they possess the moral capacity of enjoying the liberty which may be obtained by physical power.]

THE question which naturally occurs to the generality of Englishmen who are not deeply conversant with the state of Spanish affairs, is Why do not the Spanish people, like the French, rise spontaneously to arms against their oppressors ?" To enter into a full and satisfactory solution of this query, would carry us beyond the limits which we can for the present assign to the subject; and we shall accordingly remit to a future number the task of demonstrating the several causes which militate against an electric and simultaneous rising up of the Spanish nation. But whatever may be the obstacles to be surmounted, the dangers to be incurred, or the trial to be undergone, before a regeneration can be effected in Spain, neither those obstacles, dangers, or trials, can present a pretext, much less an efficient reason, for apathy and inactivity on the part of those who feel any interest in the affairs of their country. A false argument is continually adduced by the advocates of the present ruinous and humiliating system of government in the Peninsula, when they wish to paralyze the efforts of the noble-minded, or destroy the sympathy which those efforts may generate in kindred spirits in foreign countries. They say, "The Spanish people are content with the existing order of things; why, then, disturb the tranquillity of the land by attempts, the probable results of which will only be to entail a long train of calamities on the inhabitants? Why endeavor, by violent means, to introduce into the nation institutions which the mass of the public can neither understand nor appreciate?" These questions may,

at the first blush, startle and perhaps convince those who are not disposed to give the subject sufficient reflection. The validity of this argument once established, it will go to prove that Spain is doomed to continue forever in the same deplorable state; for there is no earthly reason why the question and concomitant answer should not be supplied a century hence with the same justice and propriety as at present. Are evils to be cured by letting them have full scope to prey upon their victims-or is the enlightenment of nations to be obtained by keeping individuals in a close and jealous oppression? Wait till the mass of the people becomes less gross in their ignorance-less fanatic in their superstition. But how is this to be obtained? making no efforts whatever to open the eyes of the said people?—or is the miracle to be accomplished by divine interposition ?-or, perhaps, the enlightenment of the mass of the Spanish nation is to be achieved by carefully removing from their reach all the means of coming to a knowledge of the truth? Such is precisely the aspect in which the unprejudiced will view the argument in favor of postponing Spanish liberty to a future period.

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But the Spanish nation is not, as it is gratuitously assumed, satisfied with the present system of affairs— unless, indeed, by a nation be meant the swarm of reptiles who fatten on the ruin of the land-unless by a nation be meant the tribe of placeholders and place-hunters-the sycophants, an indolent portion of the aristocracy and of a tyrannic and vicious clergy-and a degraded rabble, that care little under what form of government they live, provided they can carry on their pernicious avocations. But if, on the contrary, by a nation is understood the respectable, enlightened, and industrious classes of society, the balance will weigh prodigiously in favor of liberal institutions. These and other considerations had determined the exiled Constitutionalists, in accord

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ance with their brethren of the Peninsula, to exert their efforts in behalf of their country, so soon as a favorable opportunity should offer for carrying their undertaking into execution with any strong probability of success. The late memorable events in Paris, which terminated so fortunately in the overthrow of oppression, were the welcome messengers which told that the longwished-for moment was at length arrived, when the energies of the Spaniards were to be called into action to break the ignominious shackles which kept their country in more ignominious thraldom. It was evident that, with the downfall of an obnoxious dynasty in France, the chief support of despotism in Spain was also felled to the ground. longer would the patriots have to dread the scandalous and unprincipled invasion of a hundred thousand soldiers, sent to destroy the liberties of the land-as was the case in the year 1823. Instead of the agents and abettors of oppression, the liberals of Spain beheld now friends and brothers, who, if they did not support their cause, would at least throw no impediment in the way of freedom, much less present themselves as instruments in the hands of tyranny to enslave and oppress. Strong symptoms of revolutionary effervescence in Spain became immediately perceptible. A general movement took place among the refugees individually, or in parties; they moved towards the frontiers. The public journals were filled with speculations relating to the question at issue, and the state and prospects of Spain acquired suddenly a degree of interest and importance which offered a striking contrast with the indifference formerly displayed towards the affairs of that kingdom. Sanguine expectations of success were entertained, and the internal intrigues, occasioned by

the Carlist faction in the Peninsula, reasonably enough added another argument in favor of such anticipations. But among the obstacles which were destined to impede and check the progress of the constitutionalists, there was one more deeply deplored by the friends of Spanish liberty, as they knew the fatal effects which it was sure to produce; such was the disunion which became but too soon apparent among the chiefs that were organizing the invasion into Spain. This disunion was the more detrimental to the cause, as it originated not in the pique or disappointment of the moment, but was on the contrary an evil of long standing-an evil which had been firmly established, and was now systematically continued. That the reader may clearly understand the original cause of this calamitous difference among the Spanish patriots, it is necessary he should learn that among that valiant body there exist two distinct parties, known by the denominations of the Masones and the Comuneros. Without entering into an examination, or presuming to give a judgment, concerning the merits and demerits of these parties, it will still be necessary to afford some idea of their character, views and pretensions. The Masones possess the moral, and the Comuneros the numerical majority among the refugees. Though we must not infer from this, that there are not many Comuneros who have adhered and will adhere to the operations of the other party when they perceive inefficiency or fault in their own. The Masones contain in their ranks the greater proportion of the influential names among the liberals. The members of the Cortes of the year 1812, the old generals and patriots, &c., belong to this party.* That part of the aristocracy which entertains liberal opinions, also ad

Such as Don A. Arguilles, Don C. Valdez, Count Toreno, Martinez de la Rosa, Calatrava, Cuadra, Galiano Isturiz, &c. Among the generals--Mina, Espinoza, Placensia, Castel. lar, Butron, Quiroga, Lopez, Banos, &c.

heres to the politics of the Masones, as is also the case with the men of science and letters that have espoused the cause of freedom. The party of the Comuneros is of more modern date than that of the Masones. Its members profess more decided opinions, and its leaders are more strongly characterized by vehemence and impatience. The military chief of the party is General Torrijos, a gallant and enthusiastic young officer, who, during his sojourn in London, displayed an unusual activity and restlessness for carrying his plans into effect. The partizans of Torrijos, of greater note, are Palarea, Gurrea, Vigo, and F. Valdes, the leader of the late unsuccessful attempt.

We will now proceed to give a rapid sketch of the late events which we have already asserted have given to the cause of Spanish liberty a degree of high interest, even at a time when the affairs of France and Belgium made so powerful an appeal to the attention of the public.

Immediately after the glorious events at Paris, the Spanish patriots, resolving to make an attempt in behalf of the liberty of their country, proceeded without delay to take the necessary steps to carry their designs into execution. A provisional junta of government was formed, composed of Isturiz, Vadillo, Calatravo and Sancho, who proceeded forthwith to Bayonne, to fulfil the duties incumbent on their station. In every undertaking, even of a trifling nature, the necessity of a general leader is imperiously felt; and without unity in design and in execution, few probabilities of success can be reckoned upon. Deeply impressed with this truth, both the provisional junta and the refugees individually perceived the urgency of naming a general-in-chief, on whom the supreme command of the various bodies preparing to march into Spain should be invested. Among the various brave, experienced, and otherwise distinguished chiefs, the general opinion

ran, more especially, in favor of Mina, and he was accordingly elected. No choice could argue at once more justice and discretion—even putting aside the extraordinary merit of that general-even passing over in silence his abilities as a soldier, his rigid discipline, consummate prudence and fertility of expedients in cases of emergency— even, we repeat, making abstraction of so many claims which pointed him out to the preference of his brother liberals, the very name of Mina was in itself a host-a name not merely respected among the Spaniards, but justly admired and appreciated in foreign countries. The friends of liberty hoped that such superior pretensions would induce the various chiefs to acquiesce in the propriety of the election of Mina to the supreme command ; but, unfortunately, this was far from being the case. Without entering into invidious and disagreeable speculations, we will merely state that, whilst Espinosa, Plasencia, Butron, and other generals, readily and joyfully subscribed to the choice, there were other chiefs who opposed it, and determined to act independent of his authority. Colonel Valdes, De Pablo, and Vigo, were more conspicuous in this opposition, and they forthwith applied themselves to hasten their invasion into Spain. This unfortunate circumstance was a source of great sorrow and perplexity to the more prudent among the Spaniards. They harbored fearful anticipations that much mischief might ensue from this spirit of disunion, and they even dreaded that the immediate success of the cause might be affected by the event. Negociations were entered upon, which proved abortive, and an entrance into Spain without further delay was the result. It is, however, but just to observe, that the decided hostility evinced by the sub-prefect of Bayonne towards the constitutionalists, and the numberless paltry vexations with which he contrived to annoy them, might also have weight

in influencing the resolution taken by the oppositionists to Mina. Be this as it may, a detachment of constitutionalists entered Spain on the 15th of October, under the command of a chief in the interests of Torrijos and the Comuneros.

Colonel Don Francisco Valdes is an officer who possesses in no ordinary degree the quality of daring intrepidity. He is, besides, enthusiastically attached to the cause of liberty, and bears a character of unimpeached honor and integrity. Added to this, his great activity and the recollection of his attempt at Tarifa, have invested him with a degree of merit which gained him partizans, and enabled him to muster up a respectable body of followers. But let us calmly ask, is this enough to justify Valdes for his ambition, or excuse his reluctance to act under the orders of such a man as Mina? This unhappy breach among the constitutionalists paved the way to the spirit of intrigue, and the enemies to Spanish liberty would not allow so favorable an opportunity to escape without setting all their engines to work, in order to multiply the difficulties which the folly of the patriots themselves conspired to increase. From the very active part which certain persons played, from the pecuniary means at the command of other men by no means deserving of implicit trust, and from a variety of circumstances which it is superfluous to enumerate, we may draw the most melancholy inferences concerning the series of intrigues carried on among the deluded Spaniards, whom, it now appears, no lesson of experience can render wiser.

Colonel Valdes then, after a stormy interview with Mina, effected, as we have related, his entry into Spain but his first movements were for some time totally unknown to the public. Indeed, the most contradictory accounts were daily in circulation concerning the progress of the small band, and the encouragement afforded by the inha

bitants. One day Valdes was completely routed, and the next we heard of his repulsing a force of two thousand men under Juanito. So imperfect was the information received, that the greatest variety of opinion existed even with regard to the amount of the numeral strength of the invaders. Some boldly asserted that the corps of Valdes amounted to eight hundred strong, while others were only willing to allow the colonel half the number. The latter were, no doubt, nearer the mark. Colonel Leguia sustained a partial check, and this gave rise to the rumor of the total discomfiture of the liberals-a rumor very industriously circulated by a certain Spanish capitalist of Paris, deeply interested in the present affairs. No event of importance, however, took place. Valdes maintained his position at Zugarramurdi, but it does not appear that he derived any considerable advantage therefrom; the desertions from the enemy were few, and, as far as we can gather, the conduct of the inhabitants not remarkable for cordiality.

The attempt of Colonel Valdes possessed none of the elements which could count probabilities of success, or remove gloomy anticipations from the more prudent and experienced among the patriots. A small body of men, hastily equipped and indifferently organized, invade Spain, and their movement is undertaken through a province which, owing to certain privileges which it enjoys, has always exhibited a decided hostility towards the constitutional government. The leader of this band, though a brave and honorable officer, is neither from experience, abilities, or station, of sufficient weight to take on himself the responsibility of so arduous an enterprise; indeed, the whole affair bears rather the semblance of an experimental adventure, than of a regular, judicious, and systematic military operation. Jejune and illconcerted measures-imperfect in

formation of the country and the enemy-want of means and authority, come to increase these obstacles to success.

The position of General Mina was at this moment extremely delicate and perplexing. The ignorant and mischievous men who had hitherto used their utmost endeavors to fix odium and reproach on the character of that honorable soldier, would, under existing circumstances, have another opportunity to seize upon in order to vent the venom of their spite and envy. The most odious aspersions had been systematically disseminated against the fair fame of the general. By the most lenient he had been represented as an indolent, selfish man, who, possessing the means of enjoying a tranquil life, preferred his ease and comfort to the prosperity of his country. But there were Spaniards, also, some from sheer ignorance and imbecility, others from still less excusable motives, who blushed not to advance the most weighty accusations against him. His honor and integrity were called in question-he was represented as a traitor to the cause of liberty; and there were some who went so far as to give it to be understood that he was afraid of marching into Spain -Bisum teneatis! General Mina turned coward! And why all this violent persecution against him who had rendered such essential services to his country? Simply, because he would not blindly enter into every mad scheme which any imprudent man thought fit to agitate. We will not offer an insult to General Mina by undertaking an idle defence of his conduct. Yet the mischief which this systematic and abominable persecution of Mina does to the Spanish cause is immense. The friends of the cause abroad have neither the time nor the opportunities of entering into a proper investigation of motives, and drawing reasonable inferences. They only see things en masse which deserve condemnation, and,

in dealing this award, a separation of the innocent from the delinquent cannot easily be attained. The natural result is, that foreigners, however favorably inclined towards the cause, come to a conclusion that it cannot prosper as long as it possesses no more competent supporters.

But there was another and a very powerful reason to determine Mina to adopt the resolution which he ultimately took. The rashness of Valdes seriously compromised the enterprise into which they had embarked, at the same time that it exposed that commander to probable destruction. It was indispensable to march immediately to his support, and by vigorous exertions endeavor to counteract the mischief of a first blunder. It was neither humane nor politic, to abandon these Spaniards to their fate. Impelled, therefore, by such weighty considerations, but against the dictates of his better judgment, General Mina determined to march forthwith into Spain. He felt fully aware of the incompetence of the means in his power to carry on any extensive operations, and he probably limited his views, for the moment, to reconnoitring the country, and aiding to liberate Valdes from his difficult position. The force which Mina could command has been differently stated, but we have good reason to suppose it did not exceed three hundred men. these a considerable number were officers of all ranks, from that of general to lieutenant; these gentlemen formed themselves into a body, which they called the sacred battalion, and they cheerfully submitted to undergo all the toil, and perform all the duties, of private soldiers. The services of these men, however valuable in other circumstances, were little available in the present posture of events. These officers were old veterans, the youngest not below forty, almost all infirm and suffering from the effects of a long series of sorrows and misfortunes;

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